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3Introduction
The latest installment of the much anticipated Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) has recently been released by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. This 
Congressionally mandated report has, as the name suggests, been issued ap-
proximately every four years since 1997. The year-long QDR review process 
consumes hundreds of hours and involves a broad swath of the security com-
munity both inside and outside of the Pentagon. Its purpose is to examine “de-
fense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget 
plan and other elements of the defense program and policies”, looking 20 years 
into the future. Paradoxically, the QDR is both highly discussed and antici-
pated among defense analysts, while consistently derided after each release for 
its irrelevance and failure to prioritize. It is true that each of the three previous 
QDRs have generally failed to outline the specific military means required to 
achieve the nation’s strategic goals within the Defense Department’s budgetary 
constraints. It can by no means be considered a true “strategy” document.
Rather, the value of the QDR is as a concept document. Because the 
process incorporates such a broad group of American (and for this QDR, also 
foreign) security and defense actors, it offers a snapshot of how the US views 
the international security environment, its national interests, threat analysis, 
how the US conceptualizes conflict and under what circumstances policymak-
ers anticipate the future application of American military force. The integration 
of these QDR themes together with other strategic documents – such as the 
National Security Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, the Joint Forces Com-
mand’s Joint Operating Environment document and the latest National Defense 
and Military strategies – presents a good picture of the long range trends in US 
strategic thinking. This analysis focuses primarily on grand strategic thinking 
and therefore skips over both the detailed force structure and equipment dis-
cussions, as well as new and much-heralded sections about “taking care of our 
people” and a risk management framework. This is not intended as a compre-
hensive summary, although summaries of some sections are included.
Bottom line: Continuity from the Bush administration
While some analysts touted this QDR as a ‘no news’ document, the fact that 
much of this QDR could have been predicted prior to its release is, arguably, 
news in and of itself. While many questioned the perceived ideological and stra-
tegic excesses of the Bush administration, exemplified by its 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, a heavy reliance on democracy promotion rhetoric and a sense that the US 
was overreaching, many expected the incoming Obama administration to lower 
its strategic ambitions and pursue a more ‘realist’ (a la Kissinger) foreign policy. 
Some predicted the gradual return of 19th century multipolarity and expected 
the US would adjust course accordingly, perhaps even seeking some sort of in-
ternational security ‘concert of nations’ structure with its allies and partners. 
The broad contours of the 2010 QDR suggest that US policymakers 
seek to extend the US hegemonic role within the international system, a role 
built primarily upon the continued global projection of American military pow-
er. Michéle Flournoy suggested that the ‘bumper sticker’ for this QDR would 
be ‘rebalancing’. Rather than rebalancing the strategies and policies that many 
saw as an overextension of national power, however, this QDR instead strives 
to institutionalize the ‘lessons learned’ from the previous administration and has 
calibrated US military planning and force structures to attempt to conduct the 
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ideologically charged – manner. Key elements of this include continued domi-
nance of the global commons and increased emphasis on anti-access/area denial 
capabilities (A2/AD), a renewed focus on regional deterrence, continued atten-
tion to and institutionalization of counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism 
(CT) and security and stability operations, and increased attention to regional 
partnerships – in particular, Security Force Assistance. The military role foreseen 
by the QDR authors continues to be an interventionist one, characterized by the 
continued reliance on ground forces to conduct COIN, CT and stability opera-
tions, while increasing the burden on naval and air forces to secure the global 
commons and counter A2/AD threats. 
In sum, US military leaders and policymakers anticipate the continued 
active engagement of US forces abroad in much the same capacity (if not the 
same level of intensity) as during the past eight years. Rather than seeking to 
reduce the ambitions of US strategic goals to more sustainable levels, the QDR 
reflects a consensus view that the military should instead recalibrate and adapt 
to better perform the broader roles assigned to it. The lack of debate over these 
conclusions – domestic public debate over national security has largely focused 
on the military’s ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy and proper interrogation proce-
dures for terrorist suspects1 – serves to illustrates the continued strong biparti-
san support for US primacy, especially as the American public focuses inward 
on its flailing economy and a heated national health care debate.2
Strategic environment and threat analysis
Similar to other analyses (the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 
2025, the Joint Operating Environment, and the 2008 National Defense Strate-
gy), the QDR anticipates an especially unstable and less structured international 
security environment over the next several decades. Uncertainty surrounds the 
rise of China and India and their integration into the global system, concern 
over the combination of extremist non-state actors and globalization trends that 
reduce barriers to advanced technologies, WMD proliferation and the possibili-
ty of the destabilization or collapse of a nuclear weapon state (such as Pakistan), 
and a host of other destabilizing trends such as increased demand for resourc-
es, rapid urbanization, climate change impacts, and cultural and demographic 
1 That a political debate over Obama’s failure to employ the term “war” with regard to 
terrorism coincides with the release of document that requires several pages to describe 
the complexity of current and future conflicts – conflict scenarios in which the word 
‘war’ is as misplaced as the politically-charged term “victory” – simply highlights how 
unconstructive and unrelated such debate – however useful to tactical domestic politics – 
is to overall US security policy.
2 As an aside, the most recent budget proposal reflects a slight increase in defense spending, 
although experts predict stagnating defense expenditures over the medium to long term 
due to increasing budget pressures from domestic entitlement programs. The close 
relationships between the defense industry, the Pentagon, and Congress – expressed in 
district and state political maneuvering over the retention or addition of defense jobs as 
well as in the recent increased emphasis on sustaining the industrial defense infrastructure 
during the impending downturn – may serve to reduce the severity of defense cuts. The 
longstanding robust public support for the US military and the political popularity of a 
strong national defense (especially during wartime), may also lessen the impact of federal 
budgetary belt-tightening on defense spending.
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challenging as US conventional dominance causes adversaries to employ asym-
metric methods or a mix of asymmetric and conventional tactics termed ‘hybrid 
warfare’. American interests in – and access to – the global commons (sea, air, 
space and cyberspace) will be increasingly important as anti-access capabilities 
are employed to deny US power projection.  
A section near the end of the QDR acknowledges the likely geopolitical 
impacts of climate change, including exacerbating food and water shortages, 
poverty, environmental degradation, weakening fragile governments, increasing 
the risk of spreading disease and mass migration. These second order effects will 
worsen the destabilizing international security trends that already concern US 
policymakers. In addition, climate change will likely threaten the physical secu-
rity of a number of US military installations. In the maritime commons of the 
Arctic, melting ice will allow seasonal commerce and transit. The QDR presents 
the challenges in the Arctic less as security threats and more in terms of practical 
commercial considerations: communications gaps, search and rescue capacities 
and situational awareness. 
Role of military power
The QDR espouses a “whole of government” approach that integrates all ele-
ments of national power to protect US national interests, which are quite gener-
ally and perfunctorily listed as security, prosperity, broad respect for universal 
values and international order that promotes cooperative action. It is noted that 
as the US is the only nation with global power projection, it has an obligation 
to be a responsible steward of that power. Similar to past documents, this QDR 
also expresses a desire for strong alliances and a preference for diplomacy, but 
notes that the US retains its ability to act unilaterally and decisively when ap-
propriate. The QDR also contains a type of Powell/Weinberger doctrine formu-
lation for determining when US military force will be considered: taking into ac-
count US and allied interests, treaty commitments, and likely costs and expected 
risks of military action.
Statements regarding multilateral cooperative efforts are similar to past 
QDR documents, though this edition places particular emphasis on enabling 
security partners and building partner capacity. The QDR notes that such meas-
ures may reduce the need for long term US deployments. It may be worthwhile 
to note, however, that later sections of the document seem to emphasize bilat-
eral relationships and regional security structure that will, in practical terms, 
rely heavily on US military cooperation and presence. While the language of 
the QDR may be seen as an admission that the US can no longer afford to ‘go it 
alone’, the practical implementation of regional security partnerships may likely 
most resemble those in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), the Middle East 
(Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Israel) or South Asia (India, Pakistan, Australia, 
Thailand, Singapore), where the regional states function more as a facilitator 
and the US provides the military muscle.
Defense objectives
The QDR lists four main sets of objectives. First, the US seeks to prevail in to-
day’s wars through a responsible drawdown in Iraq and denying, disrupting and 
degrading the Taliban in Afghanistan, while building Afghanistan’s military and 
governmental capacity. Absent from this QDR is the strategic rationale for the 
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come of today’s conflicts will directly shape the global security environment for 
decades to come”, it remains largely silent on exactly how regional instability 
and failed states present an existential security threat to the US. As this connec-
tion – ostensibly grounded in concerns over terrorist safe havens – represents 
the principle argument for a successful outcome in Afghanistan (and Obama’s 
determination to increase US and allied efforts there) as well as the continued 
building of US COIN, CT and stability operations capabilities, US policymak-
ers have yet to clearly spell out the linkages. If this is indeed among the most 
pressing US national security interests then the US military will likely be heavily 
engaged around the global for decades to come, given the host of destabilizing 
trends predicted to unfold over the next decades.
Second, the US seeks to prevent and deter conflict by, inter alia, building 
partner capacity through US military-to-military training, advising and assist-
ance to partners, contributing to coalition and peacekeeping operations, support 
US diplomatic efforts to improve governance and counter extremism, extend 
global defense posture of forward stationed forces and prepositioned equip-
ment. These are highly ambitious and force-intensive endeavors that combined 
with the emphasis on failing states and regional insecurity almost guarantees the 
substantial continued forward deployment of US military capabilities. 
The Obama administration, with its stated goal of working towards the 
elimination of nuclear weapons, has reportedly struggled in its ongoing (and 
delayed) Nuclear Posture Review to reconcile the dream of Global Zero with 
the need to reaffirm US extended deterrence commitments. Deterrence, particu-
larly tailored regional deterrence, has re-emerged as an important element of US 
security policy after President Bush questioned its continued relevance during 
his first term (tailored deterrence emerged in the 2006 QDR). Ballistic missile 
defenses are seen as a key component of regional deterrence structures, along 
with deployed US forces and extended deterrent guarantees. In both the QDR 
and the BMDR, there appears to be allusion toward an eventual replacement 
of US nuclear forces in Europe with BMD capabilities, something that has also 
been suggested by several academics and in a recent New York Times article (28 
February 2010).
Third, the US will prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide 
range of contingencies, including terrorist attacks, domestic natural disasters, 
state aggression (including A2/AD capable or nuclear armed states), locating 
and securing WMD, supporting and stabilizing fragile states, protecting US citi-
zens abroad, conducting cyberspace operations and preventing human suffering 
due to mass atrocities or natural disasters abroad. Finally, the defense depart-
ment seeks to preserve and enhance the All Volunteer force. 
Rebalancing the Force – Six key mission areas
The QDR lists six missions that should determine US force structures. First 
and most fundamentally, the US military will defend the US and support civil 
authorities at home. Second, the force will need to succeed in COIN, CT and 
stability operations within varied operating environments. The US may need to 
help strengthen weak states and states that:
Moreover, there are few cases in which the US Armed Forces would engage in sus-
tained large-scale combat operations without the associated need to assist in the 
transition to just and stable governance. Accordingly, the US armed forces will 
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in support of local authorities and, if necessary, to support civil authorities in 
providing essential government services, restoring emergency infrastructure, and 
supplying humanitarian relief (p. 20).
This seems to acknowledge that future major combat operations will likely en-
tail nation-building, either as a result of forcible regime change or intensive 
stability operations due to state failure. The QDR authors view the ongoing 
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan not as “transitory or anomalous 
phenomenon in the security landscape”, but as the operational status quo for 
the “indefinite future”. This is not a point to be taken lightly. While forcible 
regime change may not be in the offing, current military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are seen as the rule, rather than the exception. As the anticipated 
international political, social and demographic trends portend an increasingly 
unstable global security environment, the perceived role of the United States as 
a security provider will only increase. The ideological component of US policy 
remains implicit: while democracy promotion and good governance are not cen-
tral themes of the Obama administration, it is clear from this QDR that the use 
of US military forces to carry out democratic nation-building is anticipated to 
continue.
In a third and related mission, the US will build the security capacity of 
partner states through security cooperation (bilateral and multilateral training, 
foreign military sales and financing (FMS and FMF) and military-to-military 
exchanges. This Security force Assistance (SFA) is considered to be especially 
important in the coming years. The Bush administration also emphasized build-
ing partner capacity as a means of preventing instability and promoting good 
governance, especially in countries like the Philippines, Colombia and through-
out Africa under the auspices of the newly established Africa Command. In this 
mission role, supporting UN peacekeeping efforts is also mentioned. 
Fourthly, the US military will deter and defeat aggression in anti-access 
environments by potentially hostile nation-states. Once again, US freedom of 
strategic movement, threats to US power projection capabilities and securing ac-
cess to the global commons is emphasized. Notably, China is emphasized as an 
A2/AD capable threat, along with Iran and North Korea. The BMDR empha-
sizes the use of missile defenses to assist in countering the A2/AD capabilities of 
these three states. While some analysts felt that strategic threat posed by China 
was not adequately addressed in this QDR, US concerns over China’s ability to 
deny access (especially in the Taiwan Strait and in Southeast Asia) are evident. 
To deter and defeat aggression, the US plans to emphasize counterprolifera-
tion efforts, develop a joint air-sea battle concept, continue discussions about a 
long range strike option, strengthen US forward posture, deployed forces and 
improve base infrastructure, and enhance command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. 
Fifth, and related to A2/AD, the US military will prevent proliferation and coun-
ter WMDs by expanding counterproliferation capabilities; including interdic-
tion and cooperative threat reduction efforts as well as preparing to contain 
WMD threats from fragile states and ungoverned areas. Sixth and finally, the US 
military will increasingly be required to operate in cyberspace.
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Much has been made of the 2010 QDR omission of the two Major Region-
al Conflicts (MRCs) force planning construct, but the previous QDR also ex-
pressed reservations about the relevance of the 2 MRCs guideline, given the 
complexities of modern warfare.3 The 2010 document considers the 2 MRC 
construct outdated simply because today’s contingencies are much more com-
plex than ‘regional conflicts’, but nevertheless is unwilling to discard it com-
pletely and assumes that US military forces should be able to field a robust force 
able to protect the US against two capable nation-state aggressors. Interestingly, 
the QDR authors assume that the eventual drawdown of forces from both Iraq 
and Afghanistan (prevailing in today’s conflicts) will allow greater forces avail-
able for the other three strategic objectives (prevent and deter conflict, prepare 
to defeat adversaries, preserve and enhance the force). The “transition into less 
intensive sustained operations” will allow greater numbers of forward deployed 
forces, and while current operations have stressed land forces disproportion-
ately, future operations may entail long duration air and maritime campaigns. 
Again, this relates directly to an anticipated need to counter A2/AD capabilities 
and maintain operational freedom of movement within the global commons.
Strengthening Relationships
The QDR states plainly that NATO is the cornerstone of the transatlantic rela-
tionship, critical to security and stability in Europe, and able to address a broad 
range of issues both inside and outside of NATO’s treaty area. The document 
observes the closer cooperation between the EU, NATO and the US, though 
the focus remains on threats elsewhere (missile threat from Iran, conflict in Af-
ghanistan) Some common ground with Russia is noted, particularly on terror-
ism, proliferation and the expectation of a new START treaty, but points to 
meaningless cooperative efforts on missile defense as a positive (suggesting that 
Russia could provide technical data that would be helpful, but not necessary 
to missile defense capabilities). The QDR pointedly rejects a Russian sphere of 
influence, observing that it will “continue to engage with Russia’s neighbors as 
fully independent and sovereign states”, a phrase repeated in the BMDR. 
The most dynamic region for the US is Asia, with established allies such 
as ROK and Japan in East Asia, along with Thailand and the Philippines in 
3 From page 36 of the 2006 QDR: In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare 
has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies 
and its partners; accordingly, guidance must account for distributed, long duration 
operations, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. For the foreseeable 
future, steady-state operations, including operations as part of a long war against terrorist 
networks, and associated rotation base and sustainment requirements, will be the main 
determinant for sizing U.S. forces. Consistent with the QDR’s emphasis on prevention, 
guidance must place greater emphasis on forces and capabilities needed for deterrence 
and other peacetime shaping activities. Finally, operational end-states defined in terms 
of “swiftly defeating” or “winning decisively” against adversaries may be less useful for 
some types of operations U.S. forces may be directed to conduct, such as supporting civil 
authorities to manage the consequences of catastrophic, mass casualty events at home, 
or conducting a long-duration, irregular warfare campaign against enemies employing 
asymmetric tactics. 
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nam and Singapore, are being developed under the guise of counterterrorism, 
counternarcotics and humanitarian assistance.  However, it is difficult not to see 
these developments, as China does, as an evolving ring of allies around China’s 
eastern and southern flank. The US seeks to increase its forward presence in the 
Asia/Pacific region, singling out the geostrategically significant Singapore as a 
host nation destined for a greater role in US regional defense posture. Current 
developments in the Middle East, including substantial arms sales and intensify-
ing missile defense cooperation, illustrate the development of regional security 
architectures there. Surprisingly, Africa is afforded little attention in this section 
given that the general description of the global threats facing the US (instabil-
ity, weak states, extremism, and dangerous social, political and demographic 
trends) are well represented on that continent. 
Role of US defense Posture
The role of US global posture, as defined by the QDR, serves to reinforce the 
conclusions presented earlier. The US anticipates substantial continued – even 
increased – forward stationed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities and 
equipment. This long term, tailored forward presence will be dictated by the 
need to (1) assure allies and partners (2) balance the need for assurance with 
flexibility to respond to contingencies, (3) balance the need to assure access in 
support of ongoing operations with frailty in lines of communication (4) pro-
vide a stabilizing influence and promote regional security and (5) adapt to the 
changing strategic environment. The ‘whole of government’ approach touted 
in the document continues to be wishful thinking, as the QDR authors readily 
admit that civilian capacity is unlikely to materialize over the short term, leaving 
the military as the primary security actors. The QDR acknowledges that while 
civilian capacity to perform some of the functions now delegated to the military 
is highly desirable, such capabilities are not presently available or well-funded 
(here one might think of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)). There have been concerns both with-
in and outside the Defense Department about the militarization of foreign policy 
due to the fact that DoD remains the most competent, best equipped and most 
well funded instrument of US power to take on stabilization, reconstruction and 
humanitarian missions. While the US military may not wish to have these types 
of missions in their portfolio, as Secretary Gates has indicated on several occa-
sions, there is little other option over the medium term.
Conclusions
Rather than Flournoy’s assertion that this QDR signals a ‘rebalancing’ of the 
force, it appears that the main thrust of the document is to recalibrate the US 
military to better perform the tasks it had been assigned during the Bush admin-
istration. Rather than exploring means by which the role of US forces could be 
contracted and thereby setting the US defense posture on a more politically and 
economically sustainable course, the QDR clearly accepts most of the ambi-
tious strategic precepts of the Bush administration and strives simply to perform 
them more efficiently. While the QDR is neither a strategy nor a blueprint for 
US security policy, it does reflect how defense strategists expect the US military 
to be engaged over the course of the next twenty years. From this document, it 
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